Marxist criticism

The main point being made by critics in India is that it would inhibit India’s ability to conduct nuclear tests in the future. Secondly, India would get “sucked” into the vortex of the USA’s global security plans and interests – a point which was forcefully advanced by the left parties, especially the Communist Party of India (Marxist), or CPI(M). 

It is appropriate to mention that the CPI(M) had opposed India’s nuclear tests of 1974 and 1998 because it felt that they were directed at the People’s Republic of China, a country rather close to the party’s heart. So, to see CPI(M) carrying the banner of India’s “autonomy” to support tests in the future is rather ironic, to say the least. Indeed, politics makes strange bedfellows.

Failsafe delivery

Experimental validation of theoretical designs of new weapons is a sine qua non for technical, military and strategic reasons. But the nuclear weapons dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 fall into an interesting category because they were preceded only by one full-scale test in the Nevada desert. It is also useful to note that they were delivered over Japan by transport aircraft under circumstances of air superiority. They did not face the severe environmental or flight stresses characteristic of modern air combat or the threat from accurate surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). 

The situation today is different from 1945. The orbit of even a modest Third World nation today bristles with surveillance radars, fire control radars, reconnaissance aircraft, SAMs, interceptors and electronic warfare systems.  

Under these circumstances, vector survivability becomes as important a matter as design of the nuclear weapon itself. A lumbering transport aircraft as a nuclear vector is a sitting duck these days. The shift to combat aircraft as vectors occurred and they were invested with protective cover from escort aircraft and electronic counter-measure systems. Regardless, aircraft attrition in battle is a worrying factor in air delivery of nuclear weapons.

SAM success

The technological debut of accurate surface-to-air missiles occurred when the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft flown by Francis Gary Powers was brought down by a Soviet SA-2. It shook decision-makers and their advisers out of a complacent slumber. The second debutant was the long-range surface-to-surface missile (SSM). To reduce SSM vulnerability, deployment was silo-based; later, road or rail mobility was conferred. There is no effective defense against SSMs even today, though research and development continue in many countries. 

Submarines best

The truly survivable nuclear vector is the Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM). In the early stages, there were technological issues like reliability in non-explosive pop-up from the submerged submarine under different sea states. These were solved and the ability to be at a proper staging post in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans to engage targets in the USSR was perfected by the USA. The USSR lagged behind a bit but caught up with the USA. If India is to have a credible deterrence, it will inevitably have to invest in an SLBM programme through either acquisition or development. Acquisition is likely to be difficult; so, sustained indigenous development could be expected. 

Political decision         

There is a wide spectrum of activities in nuclear testing procedures. At the far end is a full-scale, underground nuclear test at a well-instrumented site. But no matter how desirable full-scale tests may be from the technical perspective, the final decision to allow such tests is fully and finally political. The government of the day would have to weigh the pros and cons before giving the green signal. 

In recent years, the USA has initiated a Stockpile Stewardship Programme to ensure that its nuclear weapons are up to current standards of safety, security and survivability. Vintage weapons are being retired or revamped with improved triggers and safer detonators. It is reasonable to expect that similar projects are being pursued in Russia, China and France. It is reasonable, also, to expect that India would be engaged in these activities.

A signal

Here is another politico-strategic rationale for nuclear testing by a debutant. It is the definitive signal of crossing the nuclear threshold – an index of arrival. Seismic signatures of the test would be picked by the world-wide array of seismometers which would confidently confirm the test. 

The conduct of a test would pitchfork nuclear capability to banner headlines in newspapers and in the electronic media. Whatever may be the definition of “national security interests” of the aspirant as espoused in “sponsored” bilateral or multilateral discussions, these would be dispatched to the dustbin of history after the tests have been conducted.

If the armed forces of a country are not in the loop of nuclear capability, they are entitled to be rather skeptical about scientific claims on nuclear capability. To them, nuclear weapons are “political” in nature and they would not have full and direct control over deployment and use. However, a nuclear test would demonstrate to officers and men of the armed forces that the country’s nuclear capability is not a paper tiger. A psychological barrier would be crossed and more so, if the adversary claims nuclear superiority. 

The golden rule of “Trust but Verify” applies to nuclear weapons and nuclear vectors. The verification process includes testing, qualification and clearance to military specifications. 

Nuclear testing

It would be fair to say that if changes to the nuclear core or the explosive trigger assembly were to be introduced for improvements in the yield-to-weight ratio, the need for a full-scale nuclear test would arise. Confidence may exist over these design changes through sub-system testing but assurance of performance would indicate the need to test and clear the improvements.

There are seven important features in the Agreement which deserve to be highlighted:

Both parties will cooperate in creation of a “strategic reserve” of fuel “to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of the reactors.” There will be no automatic fall of the guillotine.

There will be prompt “consultations” to avoid actions or resolve disputes that could have “adverse effects.” Implicitly, it means that if India conducts nuclear tests in the future, the consultations would cover aspects like changes in the security environment or nuclear testing by another country. 

To avoid any disruption of fuel supply for safeguarded power reactors, the USA will work with Russia, France and the United Kingdom to ensure that no discontinuity occurs. 

Reprocessing by India of spent fuel from imported turn-key power reactors will be permitted and India will build a new, safeguarded reprocessing facility for this purpose. 

If India’s security environment changes drastically and the need arises to conduct nuclear tests, consultations with the USA will precede actual testing. (Obviously, the USA would not be taken by surprise).

Termination of the agreement will need one year’s notice and be preceded / followed by consultations. There will be no automatic fall of the US guillotine. 

The validity of the agreement is for 40 years, extendable by 10 years. 

These features address, comprehensively, India’s concerns over stability and continuity of fuel supplies. 

India’s options

India has managed to live with a nuclear China since 1964 and, adjusted itself to a nuclear Pakistan after 1990. But what should India do if there are dramatic changes in its nuclear environment? Indeed, what could these changes be? 

The emergence of a nuclear Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, or Myanmar through collusive arrangements with China or any other nuclear-weapon State would certainly force a re-think of policies. Hopefully, such a development would be of widespread concern and many nations, especially supplier countries, would forsake a bit of commerce for the larger interest of non-proliferation and regional stability. If this does not happen, it is natural to expect that Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), however patchy, would be promoted to avoid a nuclear war by error or accident in the sub-continent.

If another of India’s neighbours goes nuclear, what could be the impact on India’s Minimum Credible Deterrence? What, also, would be its impact on the Indo-US agreement? The Indo-US agreement acknowledges that such developments may call for a reconsideration by India of its policies and action options. It also says that the two governments would get into a huddle. And, in the event that India needs to respond with a test (or a series of tests), the USA would not be taken by surprise – unlike 1998. 

MCD

Most new nuclear States (e.g., India) have declared a doctrine of Minimum Credible Deterrence. Ironically, the phrase was first used by the USA. 

It may be instructive to explore the method(s) for a new nuclear State to ensure that its “Minimum Credible Deterrence” is perceived by other nuclear States as credible and continues to be credible as time goes by. At the technical level, the following elements would appear to be of importance: 

sustained R&D for phased implementation of essential improvements of the stockpile;

indigenisation of critical components and materials which are denied by export control regimes;

repackaging, testing and clearance of the payload for new vectors and

adherence to the rule that “The better is the enemy of the good.”

At the politico-diplomatic level, some initiatives need to be considered and implemented as long as nuclear weapons continue as the currency of power;

working with the international community to seek elimination of nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework; 

supporting bilateral approaches to reducing nuclear tension between paired adversaries; 

cooperating with bilateral / multilateral initiatives to prevent WMDs from falling into the hands of extremist / terrorist organisations. 

It needs to be emphasised that an MCD (minimum credible deterrence) cannot be static because of the dynamic nature of any security environment. And, technology obsolescence would have to be met in a phased manner. 

Parity (or near parity) between paired adversaries would bring some sobriety and force both to re-think political strategies because of the realisation that “More is not better, when less will do.” Further, after near-parity has been reached, the natural and inevitable process of confidence-building measures may be expected to commence. These could be useful to ensure that a nuclear war is not triggered by misperceptions, miscalculations and ignorance – or worse.