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China’s rapid rise over recent years as a regional political and economic power with growing global influence is an important element in today’s strategic landscape, one that has significant implications for the region and the world. The comity of nations and India would welcome the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China. However, much uncertainty surrounds China’s future course, particularly in the area of its expanding military power and how that power might be used.
Secure underbelly?
China’s strategic security concerns are threefold. China is like a rooster with pot belly protruding into sea. It feels most vulnerable along the coastline, where its economic heartland also lies. Control over buffer regions forming its periphery is another concern. Buffer region comprises, Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia and Manchurian states; Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang. Internal security in the heartland of central and eastern China is the third major security concern.
China’s threat perceptions are twofold. Non-traditional threats of internal subversion from Islamic fundamentalists, separatists and extremists intent on overthrowing the regime continue to bedevil the government.
External threats include the following:
•  India, Japan supported by USA are seen to have the will and capacity to threaten China. India is seen as part of grand China containment design.
•  Threat manifestation is viewed mostly as diplomatic, economic isolation and external abetment of destabilising forces within.
•  Energy security, particularly flow of traffic through Malacca Strait.
Political philosophy
China’s strategic priorities are: Perpetuation of Chinese Communist Party rule, achieving sustained economic growth and development, maintaining domestic political stability, defending its national sovereignty and territorial integrity and  status as a great power.
People’s Liberation Army is guided by a clear political philosophy.
•  Twenty-four Character Strategy given by Deng Xiaoping and still relevant which says “ Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile and never claim leadership”.
•  Harmonius World Vision of Hu Jintao. It emphasises equality in international relations, non-interference and democratisation of international relations (paradoxically retaining autocracy internally). It urges a balance between competing priorities for economic development and maintaining the type of security environment within which such development can occur. This is an upgradation of defence development priority, that was earlier second to economic development. China sees first 20 years of this century as period of opportunity as regional and international conditions remain peaceful and conducive to China’s rise to regional pre-eminence and global influence. This implies, USA / NATO combine is bleeding in Iraq and Afghanistan. Russia is engaged by the western alliance and internally by depleting population.                                                                               
India is seriously grappling with internal threats in Kashmir, north-east and other states and near failing conditions in other south Asian countries. These are checkmating its rise. Japan remains tied down with its pacifist versus assertive security dilemma along with economic slowdown and poor demographics. Compared to other peer competitors China is not engaged in any downside strategic situation. Even in current economic meltdown it is better placed than other countries and remains hopefully poised to emerge stronger than others. Hu Jintao has exhorted Peoples Liberation Army to accelerate the Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese characteristics and ensure preparations for military struggles ahead.
Chinese strategic vision can be summarized as follows:
•  Attain the status of a moderately developed world power by 2049.
•  Envisions a multipolar world yet a China centric Asia.
•  Seeks to be a regional power by 2020.
•  Its baseline is development and peace.
•  China wants to avoid war but is determined to be better prepared for it as compared to its perceived competitors.
•  China’s goal is to develop comprehensive national power. It consists of hard power elements, i.e. external indicators of strength like nuclear and missile arsenal. Conventional military capability, diplomatic influence, territory / natural resources and international prestige. Soft power elements comprise economic prosperity, cultural influence and domestic cohesiveness. Both are mutually overlapping. In their view Comprehensive National Power maximises window of strategic opportunity as also enhances strategic configuration of Comprehensive National Power vis-à-vis its competitors. It is to be noted that Chinese concepts advocate application of CNP against adversary’s / competitor’s CNP. Thus strategic confrontation would begin to unfold well before military hostilities.
Defence outlay
China is the highest military spender in Asia with USD 72.8 billion defence budget in 2009. Western experts estimate it to be around USD 125 billion. Nearly per cent of its GNP goes to military at an average. It has been largest recipient of global arms imports in last 5 years (12 per cent share). There has been significant increase in its research and development budget in last three years. For last 10 years China’s defence budget growth rates have far exceeded its GDP growth rate.
Military modernisation capability goals are sought to be achieved in three phases as follows.
•  Phase 1 – Foundation Phase till 2010. It is aimed to narrow military differential with peer competitors, with emphasis on developing a leaner and meaner military machine.
•  Phase 2 – Growth Phase till 2020. The objective being to emerge as regional predominant power, with emphasis on high-tech weapon enabled Navy and Air Force.
•  Phase 3 – Attaining Asymmetry till 2050. The goal being to attain status of world class military power with focus on space warfare, nuclear deterrence and force projection.
•   Modernisation objectives comprise: preparing for military contingencies along China’s borders, integration of Taiwan and defense against Western intervention. Modernisation would be driven around three pillars; doctrine, equipment and institutional reforms.

•    Chinese military doctrine focuses on five parameters:
o  Informatisation (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Information, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance-C4I2SR), active defence, oceanic offensive, limited nuclear deterrence and RMA with Chinese flavour. The latter is evolved from precepts of     Sun Tzu, whose teachings are prominently taught in Chinese military institutions of higher learning. These are as  follows:
o  Coercion. Acme of skill is to subdue enemy without fighting. Overall goal being to create unacceptably large power asymmetry vis-à-vis present competitor / future adversary. This grand strategy could be focused at USA and other major powers like Japan, Russia and India.
o  Pre-emption. Therefore those skilled in war bring the enemy to the field of battle and are not brought there by him.
o  Guile and Subterfuge. The enemy must not know where I intend to give him battle… he must prepare in a great many places… And when he prepares everywhere he will be weak everywhere.
o  Short and Swift. An attack may lack ingenuity but it must be launched with supernatural speed. For there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited.
China’s military modernisation strategy lays down:
To feign weakness while building strength (Sun Tsu’s precept). Replace old technology with new, build up large Navy, Air Force, second artillery, army technical divisions and in that priority. Establish forward deployed bases and assets. To develop capabilities of seizing control of enemy’s communication, transportation and logistical reserves (including cyber warfare). Be ready to deal with internal missions and defence.
Strength of Chinese armed forces stands at 2.3 million with ground force- 12.60 lakh, Navy- 2.57 lakh, Air Force- 3.93 lakh and second artillery- 1.46 lakh.
Ground forces
Focus is on downsizing and building an army capable of undertaking integrated and quick tempo operations. Approximately 400,000 soldiers are based in the three Military Regions opposite Taiwan. China is upgrading the ground force with 4th generation tanks, amphibious tanks, armoured personnel carriers, automated command and control systems, enhanced fire power, C4I2SR and night fighting capability and longer range and rapid response artillery. Among the new capabilities acquired by PLA ground forces are the approximately 200 Type 98 and Type 99 main battle tanks now deployed to units in the Beijing and Shenyang Military Regions. China’s militia forces are shifting from a ground        forces-oriented support element to a multi-service force supporting the ground, naval, aviation, and missile forces. Future trends indicate theatre missile defense systems, tri-amphibious and more special forces capability. It also has strategic airborne corps that can mobilise and deploy a regiment within 10 hours and remaining force build-up within next 48 hours. By 2020 it is planning to raise three more divisions (total 40 divisions) and accretion of three more airborne divisions, making a total of six. It already has an amphibious division, two marine brigades and seven special operations groups forming projection force grouping. For active border defence under informatisation conditions it has 20 rapid reaction force brigades. The PLA is also integrating militia forces with active duty units in training for future combat operations. China’s militia forces number 10-15 million; fully integrating this force will be a challenge.
Navy
China’s naval forces include 74 principal combatants, 57 attack submarines, 55 medium and heavy amphibious ships and 49 coastal missile patrol craft.
•        China is aiming to develop off-shore defence (Blue Water Navy) capability to reach its perceived sphere of influence that is three chain of islands;
o   By 2019- Japan-Taiwan-Philippines.
o   By 2025- Sakhalin- islands in South Pacific.
o   By 2050- Aleutian Islands - Antarctica.
•        China has an active aircraft carrier research and design programme. If the leadership were to so choose, the shipbuilding industry could start construction of an indigenous platform by the end of this decade. It acquired 67,000 ton Varyag carrier from Ukraine through Macao based shipping company for floating amusement park and casino purpose, under conditions that it will not be put to military use. All electronics and power plant was removed prior to handing over and retrofitted.  As per recent reports the deck has been refurbished, electrical fittings carried out with PLA Navy markings.  As per Janes, China is nearing a decision on aircraft for its aircraft carrier programme. Under the current proposal, the Russian in-service Su-33s would be put back into production, 14 Su-33s would be used for the training phase of the programme. Varyag is expected to be used as a training platform while the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) constructs its own carrier with a similar ski-ramp
take-off, arrested recovery flight-deck design. Russian sources have now told Jane’s that under the current proposal the Russian in-service Su-33s would be put back into production and that the Navy would acquire 14 of this type to be used for the training phase of the programme.
•        The Navy is improving its
over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting capability with Sky Wave and Surface Wave OTH radars, and is developing missiles with improved range and accuracy.
•        Two new Shang-class (Type 093) nuclear powered attack submarines (SSN) and one Jin-class (Type 094) SSBN may soon enter service alongside four older Han-class SSNs and China’s single XIA-class SSBN.
•        China has an estimated ten
Song-class (Type 039) diesel-electric attack submarines (SS) in its inventory. The Song-class SS is designed to carry the YJ-82 (CSS-N-8) anti-ship cruise missile. The Yuan class SS is now assessed to be in full production and will be ready for service by 2010.
•        The PLA Navy has received seven new domestically produced surface combatants in the past two years, including two Luyang II-class (Type 052C) DDGs fitted with the indigenous HHQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile; two Luzhou-class (Type 051C) DDGs equipped with the Russian SA-N-20 long-range surface-to-air missile and three Jiangkai II-class (Type 054A) guided missile frigates (FFG) to be fitted with the medium-range HHQ-16 vertically launch naval surface-to-air missile currently under development. These ships reflect leadership’s priority on advanced anti-air warfare capabilities for China’s naval forces, which has historically been a weakness of the fleet.
•  China is continuing construction of its new Type 022 catamaran-style missile patrol craft, which will  be armed with anti-ship cruise missiles. It is also going for underwater information warfare systems and anti and underwater blockade capability.
Air force
China bases 490 combat aircraft within un-refuelled operational range of Taiwan, and has the airfield capacity to expand that number by hundreds. Many of these aircraft are upgrades of older models; however, newer and more advanced, aircraft make-up a growing percentage of the inventory.
•   The modernised FB-7A fighter-bomber will augment other multi-role and strike aircraft, such as the F-10 and Su-30MKK, already deployed with China’s air forces.
•   China is upgrading its B-6 bomber fleet (originally adapted from the Russian Tu-16) with a new variant which, when operational, will be armed with a new
long-range cruise missile.
•   The People’s Liberation Army (Air Force) received four battalions of upgraded Russian SA-20 PMU-2 long-range (200 km) surface-to-air missile  systems in July 2007. Another four battalions are expected to be delivered in 2008. The SA-20 system reportedly provides limited ballistic and cruise missile defence capabilities.
•   China’s aviation industry is developing several types of airborne early warning and control  aircraft. This includes the KJ-200, based on the Y-8 transport for early warning as well as intelligence collection and maritime surveillance, and the
KJ-2000, based on the Russian A-50 airframe.
Strategic capability
China has the most active ballistic missile programme in the world. It is developing and testing offensive missiles, forming additional missile units, qualitatively upgrading certain missile systems and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses.
•  By November 2007, the PLA had deployed between 990 and 1,070 CSS-6 and other short-range ballistic missiles to garrisons opposite Taiwan. It is increasing the size of this force at a rate of more than 100 missiles per year, including variants of these missiles with improved ranges, accuracies and payloads.
•   The PLA is acquiring large numbers of highly accurate cruise missiles, such as the domestically produced ground-launched DH-10 land attack cruise missile; the Russian SS-N-22 / Sunburn supersonic anti-ship cruise missile outfitted on China’s two SOVREMENNYY and two SOVREMENNYY II-class guided missile destroyers  also acquired from Russia; and the SS-N-27B / SIZZLER supersonic
anti-ship cruise missile, outfitted on the last eight of twelve total Russian-built
KILO-class diesel electric submarines China has acquired.
•  China is developing an anti-ship ballistic missile  based on a variant of the CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missile as a component of its anti-access strategy. The missile has a range in excess of 1,500 km and when incorporated into a sophisticated command and control system, is a key component of China’s anti-access strategy to provide the PLA the capability to attack ships at sea, including aircraft carriers, from great distances. Suitably deployed in Yunan or islands off Myanmar coast or near Gwadar, it would threaten coastal waters of strategic interest of India in Bay of Bengal and inner Indian Ocean.
•   China is modernising its longer-range ballistic missile force by adding more survivable systems. Most notably, the DF-31 and longer range DF-31A are now being deployed to units within the Second Artillery Corps.
•  China is also working on a new submarine launched ballistic missile, the JL-2, for deployment aboard new
Jin-class (Type 094) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. The JL-2 is expected to reach initial operational capability around 2009-2010.
Space weaponry
China is developing a multi-dimensional programme to limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by its potential adversaries during times of crisis or conflict. Although China’s commercial space programme certainly has utility for non-military research, it demonstrates space launch and control capabilities that have direct military application.
•  In January 2007, China successfully tested a direct ascent, anti-satellite weapon, destroying a defunct weather satellite. The unannounced test demonstrated the ability to attack satellites operating in low-earth orbit. The test raised concern among many nations and the resulting debris cloud put at risk the assets of all space faring nations, and posed a danger to human space flight.
•  China launched its first lunar orbiter on October 24, 2007. The Chang’e 1 orbiter reached lunar orbit on November 5, 2007. Successful completion of this mission demonstrated China’s ability to conduct complicated space manoeuvres – a capability which has broad implications for military counter-space operations. The Chang’e 1 mission completed the first of a three-stage plan for lunar exploration which includes China’s desire to launch an unmanned lunar rover mission in 2012 and a manned lunar landing by 2020.
•  In October 2007, China launched the fifth in a class of Space Event Support Ships, the Yuanwang 5, an ocean-going space tracking and survey vessel intended to support China’s growing space programme, including its expanding space launch activities.
•   China launched its 100th Long March series rocket in 2007 and continues to put a more sophisticated and diverse set of satellites into orbit. China is developing the Long March 5, an improved heavy-lift rocket that will be able to lift larger reconnaissance satellites into low-earth orbit or communications satellites into geosynchronous orbits by 2012 and is constructing a new satellite launch complex on Hainan Island. China expects to replace all foreign-produced satellites in its inventory with indigenously produced
sun-synchronous and geo-stationary models by 2010, with life expectancies of 5 and 15 years, respectively.
•  China announced plans to launch 15 rockets and 17 satellites in 2008. Additionally, China announced its intention to launch a third manned space mission, Shenzhou VII, in October 2008 on the heels of the Beijing Olympics, underscoring space development as an important symbol of national pride. The majority of the technology used in China’s manned space programmes is derived from Russian equipment and China receives significant help from Russia with specific satellite payloads and applications.
•  China’s leaders remain silent about the military applications of China’s space programmes and counter-space activities.
Cyber warfare
In the past year, numerous computer networks around the world, including those owned by the US government, were subject to intrusions that appear to have originated within China. These intrusions require many of the skills and capabilities that would also be required for computer network attack. Although it is unclear if these intrusions were conducted by, or with the endorsement of, the People’s Liberation Army or other elements of the Chinese government, developing capabilities for cyber warfare is consistent with authoritative Army’s writings on this subject.
•   In 2007, the Department of Defence, other US government agencies and departments and defence-related think tanks and contractors experienced multiple computer network intrusions, many of which appeared to originate in the PRC.
•   Hans Elmar Remberg, Vice President of the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Germany’s domestic intelligence agency) publicly accused China of sponsoring computer network intrusions “almost daily.” Remberg stated, “across the world the People’s Republic of China is intensively gathering political, military, corporate-strategic and scientific information in order to bridge their [sic] technological gaps as quickly as possible.” Referring to reports of Chinese infiltration of computer networks of the German government, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said “we must together respect a set of game rules.” Similarly, in September 2007, French Secretary-General of National Defence Francis Delon confirmed that government information systems had been the target of attacks from China.
•  In addition to governments, apparent Chinese origin network intrusions targeted businesses. In November 2007, Jonathan Evans, Director-General of the British intelligence service, MI-5, alerted 300 financial institution officials that they were the target of state-sponsored computer network exploitation from PRC.
Technology espionage
Authentic global intelligence agencies and think tanks have identified China as running an aggressive and wide-ranging effort aimed at acquiring advanced technologies from the United States. The officials from US Immigration and Customs Enforcement have referred to China as the leading espionage threat to the United States. Between 2000 and May 2006, the US initiated more than 400 investigations involving the illicit export of American arms and technologies to China. The former director of a research institute associated with Russia’s space agency was sentenced to eleven and a half years in prison for passing classified technology to China. According to a Russian spokesperson, the information could be used to create missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
Joint exercises
In March 2007, two Chinese Navy guided missile frigates participated in the
Pakistan-hosted multinational naval exercise, Aman 07, in the North Arabian Sea. Naval forces from the United States and seven other countries participated in the exercise, which focused on maritime counter-terrorism.
•   Premier Wen Jiabao paid his first official visit to Japan in April 2007. During the visit, Wen and Japan’s then-Prime Minister Abe agreed to expand economic ties and discuss military exchanges and mechanisms for peace in the East China Sea, an area where China and Japan hold competing sovereignty claims. People’s Republic of China Minister of Defense General
Cao Gangchuan followed Wen to Japan in June 2007 for the first senior-level defence visit in ten years. In November 2007, the Navy Luhai-class destroyer Shenzhen conducted the PRC’s first port visit to Japan.
•   In August 2007, China conducted a first time transnational deployment of 1,600 troops and equipment to Russia to participate with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member-States in a highly-scripted exercise, PEACE MISSION 2007.
•   Despite a tradition of allowing US naval vessels to make port calls in Hong Kong, in November 2007, Beijing at the last minute denied entry into Hong Kong of the USS Patriot and USS Guardian, two small mine sweepers, seeking refuelling and weather avoidance – a decision that is inconsistent with international custom regarding safe harbour. The following day, Beijing denied the USS Kitty Hawk carrier strike group entry to Hong Kong harbour on the day it was scheduled to arrive for the Thanksgiving holiday. China’s subsequent reversal of this decision following US demarches came too late to be accepted by the ships of the strike group.
•   The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations named Major General Zhao Jingmin as the first Chinese commander of a UN peace operation, the UN Mission on Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). As of December 2007, China was engaged in 13 UN peace missions with 1,800 troops deployed globally.
•   In November 2007, China deployed 135 military engineers (of an eventual 315-person force) to Darfur as the first non-African Union troop contingent for the “hybrid force.”
•   In December 2007, China and India staged “Hand-in-hand 2007,” a week long counter-terrorism exercise in China that involved 100 troops from each country. Earlier, in April 2007, the Peoples Liberation Army and Indian navies held a combined force exercise in the South China Sea. These events stand in contrast to China’s November 2007 destruction of an abandoned Indian bunker near the tri-border area in Bhutan, ignoring Indian protests.
Implications for India
Chinese doctrinal development and force transformation is in state of flux. It is unlikely to fructify significantly before 2020. It allows India a decade for focused capability development. Chinese believe that pre-emptive options are strategically and operationally attractive than reactive ones. Second, they are willing to escalate if they believe it can be managed. In a major conventional conflict China will use technology and standoff capability backed by precision strikes. Similarly Information Warfare capability is likely to see incremental sophistication. Chinese credible missile centric force designed with its counter transformation proactive strike capability needs immediate attention. We need to take short-range ballistic missile, medium range ballistic missile and also air-launched cruise missile and land-attack cruise missile capability seriously. Appropriate counter strategies need to be fashioned to include infrastructural development, dissuasive capabilities such as missile defence, countering information attacks, protecting strategic communications. In addition we need to develop capabilities to pose credible threat to Chinese C4I2SR.
There is little that India and China share in common. There are no shared socio-political, socio-cultural value systems or shared visions for the future. In this background it is not rational for India to go for unconditional rapprochement.
•   The Chinese are the very same people who showed the world that they could take on the powerful West, despite being a weak nation, without losing and simultaneously impose control over Tibet.
•   Chinese encirclement of India through soft power means, such as strategic diplomacy, economic linkages and “Finlandisation” of India’s neighbours, as well as through hard power such as a buildup of military capabilities, both nuclear, conventional, military assistance and weapons of mass destruction proliferation to India’s adversaries – these are the aspects critically important to India as it develops its own Comprehensive National Power and expands its circle of influence diplomatically, economically and militarily.
•  Sino-Indian border dispute will not be the cause for future conflict. Such a scenario, if it emerges, will be a construct of India-China economic and strategic competition, wherein boundary dispute would become a factor.
•    Any military conflict with China will be significantly different in terms of technology, force application with definite component of Network Centric Warfare. Chinese pre-emptive strategy based on effect-based operational philosophy is an important issue that Indian military planners need to take note of and factor in.
•    Development of logistics infrastructure in Tibet Autonomous Region  is significant from the Indian point of view.
•    Indian doctrinal philosophy will need to move beyond attrition or manoeuvre oriented thinking to a nuanced effect-based operational perspective. India has to enhance its strategic intelligence and surveillance capability together with rapid reaction force and Special Forces. Network Centic Warfare capabilities are likely to play significant role in future operational scenarios. Our response must be to accelerate own capability in this regard. The Chinese are likely to pursue informatisation warfare to its logical conclusion. Any asymmetry in network centric capabilities will give a definite edge to the Chinese and calls for integrated force development and application strategies based on precision force application models. Time has come for India to develop integrated force application doctrines and models to deal with emerging threats from China. Perception management that India will respond effectively is very important in any such contingency. India will have to invest in technologies that help in achieving operational and strategic manoeuvre in higher altitude areas of the mountains in the west and north-east. This includes manoeuvre by fire, physical manoeuvres and through electronic means.
•    Chinese increasing air and space capabilities are also of serious concern. Unless these are addressed, gap between Chinese Air Force  and Indian Air Force is going to increase significantly. Building an effective deep attack capability is technically challenging and could be rendered less effective if alternate strategies or force employment concepts that allow operations while under attack are developed by the adversary. Can we consider a range of responses entailing limiting its actions, altering the basic strategy for conflict to render irrelevant, capabilities of the missile forces by employing a host of defensive measures throughout full strategic depth, including escalation dominance? Our war-waging perspective requires radical shift. Same war waging models that are used against Pakistan cannot work. India has to develop its own anti-access strategy with clearly defined red lines.
•    While achieving this, India must take the initiative by employing asymmetric means of fighting hi-tech wars, i.e. fighting ability at both ends of the spectrum.
•   The Sino-Indian frontiers consist of the highest mountain mass in the world. The topographical configuration, narrow valleys, limited communication system, inhospitable terrain, vagaries of climate, susceptibility of routes to landslides, avalanches, sparse populations, lack of natural resources and vulnerability of roads to Indian Air Force, necessitates China to carry out sufficient stockpiling before any major operation against India. This justifies her need to develop communication network, increase Rapid Deployment Forces, upgrade airfields and develop air to air refuelling capability, in her future force structuring and posturing.
•   Despite major reductions in force level, it is visualized that People’s Liberation Army will not be short of forces to address any limited war. In the Indian context, depending upon the aim, terrain, weather, depth of likely operations, logistics constraints, sustainability of the chosen thrust-lines and calculation of escalation dynamics will dictate the force level to be launched. The rapid reaction force in Indian context may require equal ground logistics support as other mountain formations.
•   There is a need to evolve a model of war fighting doctrine that takes cognizance of developing technologies and concepts to create operational asymmetry to destroy and degrade technologically symmetrical or superior enemy.
•    Consequently, focused technological upgrades for systematic modernisation of Army, Navy and Air Force incorporating Revolution in Military Affairs technologies in the field of Information Technology, Electronic Warfare, Space Based Systems and Information Warfare is of great import.
•    While our networks may not be extensive enough in the near term, in the medium and long term our dependency on operational, communications and logistics networks are likely to increase. Appropriate counter strategies need to be fashioned.
•   On India’s western borders, China has very little to do to tie India down given its collusive relationship with Pakistan. China also seeks a transit corridor from southern China to the Indian Ocean via Myanmar. There has also been an intensification of Chinese activity in the Andaman Sea. China has also offered very generous aid to Bangladesh and help to modernise its defence sector. China has increased its trade with Nepal and hopes to augment it through the Tibetan region. It is imperative for India to develop a proactive stand against the escalating ambitions of the Chinese Navy.
•    In evolving our future strategy to deal with growing Chinese threat in the Indian Ocean and its forays in Bay of Bengal it would be prudent for India to develop pre-emptive strategies and upgrade its Information Warfare capacities.
•     The vulnerability of our carrier based group will be particularly high if the Chinese Navy were operating in the Bay of Bengal or the Arabian Sea close to the Indian coast. This is particularly relevant in the context of Chinese forays in Myanmar and development of Gwadar as the naval facilities assume importance.
•     China’s air force modernisation – upgrading its air and space warfare capabilities is such that in 10 years time, the gap between the force levels of the two countries will be significantly larger.
•     The emphasis on establishing long range offensive capabilities, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4I2SR) systems, modern training systems and other infrastructural modernisation, coupled with the desire to develop true joint operations capabilities has made its Air Force  a formidable opponent for the Indian Air Force to cater for.
•    In comparison to the high quality and numerous air defence radars deployed in Tibet Autonomous Region, the Indian surveillance systems and control systems are woefully inadequate.
•   Chinese focus on space warfare is another serious development. Chinese strategy would seem to value the destruction of intelligence-gathering satellites to maintain intelligence and information dominance. Chinese can be expected to interfere and attack our strategic and operational satellite communications especially Global Positioning Satellites. India needs to develop counter space warfare capabilities. 

Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence appears to be working better than ours. They have managed to circumvent our nuclear capabilities by using deeply indoctrinated jihadi terrorists as their first military echelon. Currently the jihadis have turned against the State of Pakistan. So let us just let it stew in its own juice. Any military action by us will only help to coalesce jihadi support for the Pakistan Army and Inter-Services Intelligence. That is why attempts are being made to provoke India by firing across the border and trying to increase infiltration across the Line of Control.

he persistent intelligence reports that Al-Qaeda-Lashkar-e-Toiba combine are planning Mumbai-like attacks on sensitive Indian targets have created alarm and the talk of a military confrontation between India and Pakistan has been revived. The statement of the US Defence Secretary, Dr. Robert Gates that LeT wants to destabilize the entire South Asian region and aims to provoke a war between India and Pakistan has confirmed India’s own assessment of threats posed to India and the region by Pakistan-based terrorist groups. It is necessary to examine the nature of terrorist threat from Pakistan and India’s options for dealing with it in the present environment.

First, we briefly look at the concept and possible consequences of the most frequently discussed and oft-suggested option of a limited war to bring Pakistan to heel, and then examine other possible alternatives to limit Pakistan’s capability of continuing proxy war and terrorist attacks against India.
The concept and the conduct of a war with a limited scope against Pakistan has often been under discussion in the various circles recently but most Indian military thinkers mainly focus on attaining limited tactical objectives that according to them would not provoke Pakistan to use nuclear weapons against India. The after-effects of the so called limited war and unforeseen consequences that may follow have seldom been discussed in detail.

The civilian thinking on this kind of war has never been spelled out clearly, although the national leadership must lay down the objectives of war against Pakistan including the national objectives in a limited war.  The aim and timing, overall strategy, scope and conditions of termination of a limited war must be decided by the national leadership and not by military brass that tends to lay emphasis on operational imperatives in terms of success on the battlefield, victory and glory.

Indo-Pak conflicts
It should be noted that all wars fought by India and Pakistan so far have been basically limited in scope, but as the scope was never quite clearly defined they resulted in stalemates, except in 1971 when
clear-cut political objectives were laid down by the government of the day which allowed the military to adopt suitable tactics to select and achieve military and national objectives. The limiting factors during these wars, however, were quite different and not related to nuclear scenarios as they are now.

The idea of limited war was first mooted in the California Institute of Technology in 1948 once the nuclear weapons were acquired by the Soviet Union. Later the concept of limited war was developed further by writers like Robert Osgood and Morton Halperin. It was predicated on the premise that war must remain below the nuclear level as a nuclear war will lead to unacceptable destruction of both the adversaries, restraint on means rather than ends which was central to the notion of ‘limited war’ was advocated during the cold war era. Some writers maintained that aim should be to bring the adversary to the negotiation table as soon as the limited objectives have been achieved.

Untested theories
All these theories were never really tried out since the danger of a nuclear war prevented any kind of hot war between America and Russia; arguments in the theories of limited war in that era generally pertained to an all-out war designed to keep it below the nuclear threshold and not to a ‘limited war’ designed to inhibit use of nuclear weapons by the adversary. In our case the so-called limited war will come to a screeching halt once it seems imminent that Pakistan is likely to resort to the use of nuclear weapons.

A band of military writers who have advocated the idea of a limited military confrontation with Pakistan have mostly used American or NATO terminology, bending and reshaping it. The modified terms have obscured the original concept and perhaps generally led to
under-estimating the enemy capability to counter our offensive. The political and economic consequences that would inevitably follow the so-called limited war against Pakistan and the way it will affect our international standing have been generally glossed over by enthusiasts of limited war.

The bitter lessons learnt by the Americans in Iraq or nearer home by President Musharraf in Kargil have not been given due attention by the ardent advocates of limited war against Pakistan. Most writers have not fully analysed Pakistan’s conventional and sub-conventional capabilities that could stop Indian forces short of their military objectives, and thereby deny India achieving its political and military objectives in a
time-bound programme. The argument in favour of waging a limited war under the nuclear umbrella has been generally in the context of continued terrorist attacks on Indian targets from Pakistan.

Absence of realism 
The objectives and the chances of success of a limited war against Pakistan that have been enunciated by various writers of military background may be summarized as under:
• The tremendous political, economic costs, and the large scale human suffering would prevent use of nuclear weapons by India or Pakistan hence there exists a space to achieve national objectives through a limited war.
• India will be aware of the limits to which Pakistan should be pushed in a limited war and therefore can plan a successful campaign under the nuclear umbrella.
• Our aims can be well achieved through restrictive use of force in the form of reprisal that will compel Pakistan to stop terrorist attacks on Indian targets.
• The battlefield will be confined to a local geographical area that will not pose an existential threat to Pakistan hence Pakistan would have no reason to risk a nuclear war especially as its economic, social and political patterns of existence will not be threatened.   A restricted military operation without destroying the enemy vital areas or military capabilities is the best option open to teach Pakistan a lesson.
• Based on the experience of Kargil war, these advocates believe that India could fight such a war and win it.
• A limited war would increase the cost of supporting militancy by Pakistan beyond acceptable limits besides sending signals to militant groups operating out of Pakistan that they would not go unpunished.
Indian security analysts, in particular former military officers, have generally talked of limited wars in terms of rapid manoeuvres to capture selected parts of Pakistani territory for use as a bargaining counter; their analysis is mainly focused on cold start and aggressive employment of pivot corps, integrated battle groups, air and naval forces.

Between the lines 
A rather frivolous reaction by a senior Pakistani Air Force officer is produced below. His observations point out Pakistan’s military assets that would stop our offensive in its tracks. These observations may be taken with a big pinch of salt but should be noted nevertheless. These are produced below partly paraphrased.
‘The new Indian strategy calls for rapid movement across Pakistani rivers, and have a “chota peg” in Lahore Gymkhana, before the Pakistanis can say “Allah Ho Akbar”.  Superhuman Indians believe that by a rapid offensive:
• They will be able to move across heavily mined terrain under the watchful eye of more than 200,000 soldiers and satellites without detection or resistance.
• Neither Pakistan radars, nor the AWACs (The Pakistani hawks in the sky: Y-89 AWACS) nor the half a million eyeballs will be able to see them as they waltz across the border.
• During the hours that it takes to mobilize the Indian Army, the Pakistanis will be asleep, and will not get disturbed by the noise and movement of entire tank divisions across the border (Pakistani made UAVs are: Uqaab and  Jasoos).
• For 96 hours, Pakistan will not fire a single Hatf and Shaheen missiles at the advancing enemy (Pakistani defence is based on missile nuclear deterrent: Hatf, Shaheen, Ghauri, Babar and Abdali which are far more advanced then previously believed).
• According to this cock and bull theory, as the Indians advance, the Pakistani Air Force, made up of up F-16s, Mirages, and JF-17 Thunders will not strike at the slow moving tanks and artillery (PAF: Nuclear armed deterrent to hegemony).
• According to the [Indian] doctrine, the Rapid Force will be able to “pulverize” the Pakistanis, and “evaporate” the Pakistani tank divisions like clouds (Pakistan’s 500 Al-Khalid tanks have been in production since 2001. Next generation tanks exported via IDEAS). 
•   The tanks and artillery will simply disappear into thin air allowing the advancing Rapid Thrust Force to get to the Gymkhanas and have “chota pegs”.

All-out war
The above Pakistani hyperbole notwithstanding, the question is whether there is sufficient time and space for India to wage a limited war against Pakistan in which it would occupy a large slice of Pakistani non-vital areas and yet cripple Pakistan military machine to an extent that not only will Pakistan sue for negotiations but agree to all our conditions. In my view such an outcome in a limited war is not possible, such an outcome is only possible if Pakistan is engaged and defeated comprehensively in an all-out war.
This kind of war, however, can be ruled out due to the availability of nuclear weapons to both the countries. The question is will a conventional war, whether limited or with no holds barred force Pakistan to stop proxy war and terrorist attacks against India and sue for lasting peace.   A limited war according to its advocates would punish Pakistan for heinous crimes it has committed against our country; but punitive action will only have a short-term impact on Pakistan and leave its capability to carry on proxy war and terrorism against us intact.
A limited war by India on the other hand may help Pakistan unite all the jihadist and non-jihadist factions against us, a situation Pakistan cannot hope to create on its own in the present circumstances.
The Indian mobilization in 2001 named Operation Parakram was a direct threat of a war intended to signal to Pakistan that India will certainly go to war if terror attacks continue. The message to Pakistan to dismantle the terrorist outfits operating from its territory and stop terrorist attacks went unheeded. Pakistan was not deterred and terrorist attacks continued; the threat of a war breaking out between two nuclear armed countries bothered the international community more than Pakistan.

Kargil failure   
If Kargil war by Pakistan is taken as an example of a limited war below the nuclear threshold, it obviously failed to achieve both its military and political objectives. In response India achieved its immediate objective of forcing the enemy out of Kargil heights but no more. India gained only a limited tactical victory and the strategic stalemate continued.

A conventional war even when limited in time and space will impose severe economic costs on us and will fail to deter Pakistan as discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. It would therefore be better to take recourse to non-conventional methods of warfare to deal with Pakistani belligerence. Imaginative thinking, innovative methods, highly specialized troops, equipment and training will be required to wage a prolonged non-conventional war to accomplish our aims. An assault on the economic, socio-cultural and political structure of the adversary while weakening its military capability should form an intrinsic part of our long-term strategy.

Target terrorists 
In the present circumstances instead of using conventional methods the immediate focus should be on targeting centres of gravity of Pakistan’s terrorist set up through political and multifaceted action plans. Our first assault should be on the terrorist organizations and their supporting infrastructure in Pakistan or other countries with a view to cripple their offensive capability. Selective elimination of terrorist and fundamentalist groups and their leaders, attacks to destroy terrorist hideouts and bases, besides degrading their political base will form part of this war.

To achieve our objectives we will require innovative methods, highly specialized quasi-military forces, specially equipped and trained to accomplish these tasks. In this kind of war air, land and sea power will not play a major role as unconventional methods and asymmetrical strategies will be used to destroy institutional support of terrorism from within.

Covert operations   
A quasi-military force should be trained to develop covert capabilities for harassing, disrupting and destroying the logistic support facilities of the terrorist groups operating from Pakistan. This force could operate in small mission-oriented groups equipped with high technology weapons to destroy material and human assets of terrorist groups operating from Pakistan and PoK. The aim would be to cause inordinately large number of casualties among the terrorist groups to demoralize them, disrupt their logistic support systems and means of communication.
Sophisticated technology can radically alter the concepts and pattern of operations against terrorist organizations operating from Pakistan. Robotics, remotely piloted vehicles and artificial intelligence can radically change the ways of tackling jihadi terrorists operating out of Pakistan. Directed energy may permit small elements to destroy multiple fleeting targets.  Remote, “smart” assets with preprogrammed artificial intelligence can greatly assist in locating and destroying terrorist groups.

Psychological warfare    
Well planned psychological operations can play a decisive role in destroying terrorist support bases within our own country rather than conventional methods. A special organisation should be raised, trained and equipped for psychological operations for degrading socio-political bases of fundamentalist organizations supporting militancy and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. 
Conventional forces have generally been rendered obsolete or ineffective against shadowy terrorist groups. There is requirement of comprehensive study to understand the future patterns of terrorism and organising suitable forces and systems to defeat terrorism. We cannot depend on quickfix solutions like a limited war to ensure long-term security and integrity of our country.