Space

“Space”: No More the Untouched Frontier

As humans rapidly advance through the 21st century, the ‘battlefield’ is rapidly evolving into unseen domains, like those never witnessed before. The term “convergence’ warfare is fast gaining traction which refers to the evolving battlefield incorporating few or all the following:

  1. Information warfare
  2. Psychological warfare
  3. Cyber warfare
  4. Warfare using the Electromagnetic spectrum
  5. Drone warfare
  6. Technology enabled warfare supported by Artificial Intelligence
  7. Nuclear warfare (largely deterrence based)

These paradigms are defying the concept of traditional “contact” warfare which should in the future become obsolete, as things progress in the right direction. The related concept of aerospace dominance is also getting diluted as the next era appears to be of pure ‘Space’ dominance, which as of now is the turf of the limited and elite few.

Militarisation of Outer Space

In this context, currently USA is the clear leader having approximately 450 plus satellites orbiting Earth, which includes only government and military satellites, excluding commercial space satellites (number 5100 plus) according to data given by “UCS Satellite Database”. This exponential figure is closely followed by China, with 157 claimed military satellites in orbit, according to “WorldAtlas” portal. “ANI”estimates this number at 245 citing dual-use satellites or those which in the garb of commercial satellites can support the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for providing military grade ISR* (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) capabilities.

These military satellites include coverage in LEO/MEO/GEO (low earth orbit, medium earth orbit, geostationary orbit) as well as elliptical orbits thus equipped for comprehensive C4ISR (Command, Control, Communication, Computer) ISR missions, apart from undeclaredspace weapon capabilities which could in base-case scenarios include “directed energy weapons” (targeting earth based targets), radio jamming power surges (to disable communications on earth and conventional radars) and anti-satellite missiles (called ASAT with kinetic kill capabilities on opponent satellites in space, also capable of proximity interference capabilities) and early detectionof ballistic missile launches on earth.

The key actors in China’s military satellite framework for strategy formulation include:

  • People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF): Formed in 2015, it centralizes China’s space, cyber, and electronic warfare operations.
  • China National Space Administration (CNSA): Although primarily civilian, CNSA supports dual-use technologies.
  • China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) & China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC): State-owned enterprises responsible for satellite manufacturing and launch services.

Strategic Documents

  • China’s 2019 Défense White Paper identifies space as a critical domain of military competition.
  • Official PLA doctrine increasingly refers to “space dominance” (zhitian quan) as necessary for “informationized” warfare and further advancing to “intelligentized” warfare.
  • The doctrine emphasizes:
    • Denying adversary use of space (offensive counterspace).
    • Ensuring PLA access to space (defensive space control).
    • Integrating space ops into joint campaigns (with allies).

The USA maintaining its focussed view on China’s space ambitions has clearly stated that China is strongly intent on bridging the perceived gap between itself and US space capabilities and Pentagon claims the China’s ISR fleet has clearly doubled itself from the period 2018-24. This has made the PLA getting enabled to watch out closely the potential regional flashpoints including Korean peninsula, Taiwan, Indian ocean and south China sea. It is also pertinent to mention that where US has its “GPS” system, China has successfully added its own system called “BeiDou”, which is a constellation with about 45 satellites that can give positional accuracies of approximately five meter in the Asia-Pacific region and acts as a powerful GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System). China’s commercial space sector is also growing rapidly and is on to become a major competitor to the US by 2030, also developing a LEO satellite internet service to compare with Western commercial services like Starlink belonging to SpaceX in the US.

To put things in perspective the following expenditure table is presented:

Likely Developments by 2030

By 2030, likely developments include the deployment of a space-based missile early warning constellation, greater automation and AI integration into satellite and Space Situational Awareness (SSA) systems, the potential deployment of offensive cyber tools integrated with space operations, and enhanced satellite launch-on-demand capabilities using mobile platforms.

Key U.S. Military Space Entities

To understand these trends fully, it helps to compare them with the U.S. military satellite program. The key entities involved in U.S. military space operations are the U.S. Space Force (USSF), established in 2019 to oversee all military space activities; the U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM), which conducts space warfighting operations; the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which manages reconnaissance satellite development and operations; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), which uses satellite imagery for military intelligence; the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which develops future-oriented satellite technologies; and the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), which conducts research and development for space systems.

Strategy and Doctrine

The U.S. 2020 Defense Space Strategy emphasizes space superiority, resilience and deterrence, and integration with the joint force. Additionally, Space Policy Directive-4 (SPD-4) declares space as a warfighting domain.

Counterspace Capabilities

U.S. counterspace capabilities include electronic warfare tools such as GPS and satellite communications jammers like the Counter Communications System (CCS), cyber capabilities for offensive and defensive operations in space, kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons such as ground-launched systems like the mid-1980s ASM-135 (though no longer active, the technology remains), and directed energy weapons, with research focused on ground-based lasers designed to blind or disable satellite sensors.

FY2024 U.S. Space Force Budget Focus

In FY2024, the U.S. Space Force received about $30 billion, with funding focused on missile warning systems, satellite communications, and efforts to strengthen space resilience and counterspace capabilities.

Strategic Posture

A. Deterrence and Resilience

The U.S. emphasizes deterrence and resilience, with a focus on “resilience by disaggregation,” which means deploying many small satellites instead of relying on a few large, vulnerable ones. Programs like the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) by the Space Development Agency (SDA) are central to this shift.

B. Coalition Operations

The U.S. space strategy is also closely integrated with NATO and the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, which includes the U.S., UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Joint missions such as the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites and GPS ensure interoperability across allied forces.

C. Tactical Integration

Space-based Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and communications systems provide data that support Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2), hypersonic missile tracking and interception, and the operations of unmanned systems and autonomous targeting.

Strategic Summary of this case is as follows:

United States

The United States possesses full-spectrum dominance in space-based military capabilities. It remains strong in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), communication, missile warning, and counterspace tools. The focus is now shifting toward resilience, the proliferation of more satellites, and closer fusion between commercial and military space efforts. However, challenges include an over-reliance on space systems, cyber vulnerability, and threats from adversary anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.

China

China is making big strides in ISR, satellite navigation, and counterspace capabilities. It is likely pursuing asymmetric strategies such as jamming and co-orbital interference. Despite these advances, China still lacks the global scale, resilience, and fully integrated doctrine that the U.S. has. However, it holds advantages in the frequency of satellite launches, the rapid growth of dual-use satellites, and strong domestic manufacturing capabilities.

Bottom Line

The bottom line is that the U.S. still maintains a clear military advantage in space but faces a narrowing technological gap as China aggressively expands its capabilities. The next decade will be defined by resilience, the proliferation of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constellations, AI-driven automation, and the escalating risk of space becoming a contested warfighting domain.

References

Think Tanks & Research Institutions

  • CSIS – Centre for Strategic and International Studies
    • Space Threat Assessment 2023China Military Power Series
  • Secure World Foundation
    • Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open-Source Assessment (2023 Edition)
  • RAND Corporation
    • Reports on space resilience, military satellite trends, and Chinese space doctrine
  • Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) Satellite Database
    • Open database tracking satellites in orbit (with civil/military classification)
  • The Aerospace Corporation
    • Space-based ISR, PNT (Position, Navigation & Timing), and missile warning analysis

📰 News Outlets and Investigative Journalism

  • Defense NewsSpaceNewsBreaking Defense
  • Jane’s Defence Weekly (IHS Markit)
  • ReutersThe DiplomatSouth China Morning Post (SCMP)

📈 Commercial Data and Academic Sources

  • Satellite imagery companies: Planet, Maxar, CGSTL (China)

Academic journalsJournal of Strategic StudiesSpace Policy, and Acta Astronautica

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